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AN INDIGENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO EXPERT PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE:
AKE v. OKLAHOMA
N October 1979 Glen Burton Ake and a companion' burglarized the
Oklahoma home of the Reverend Richard Douglass. Ake bound,
gagged and shot four members of the Douglass family; the Reverend
Douglass and his wife died as a result. After apprehension Ake dictated,
corrected, and signed a forty-four-page statement regarding the offense. 2
During the succeeding two months Ake appeared in court three times3 with-
out making any claims regarding his mental condition.4 At his formal ar-
raignment in February 1980, the court noted Ake's disruptive behavior and,
sua sponte, ordered psychiatric evaluation of his competency to stand trial. 5
After evaluation the court found Ake incompetent and ordered commitment
in a state institution. Six weeks later the chief psychiatrist at the state insti-
tution informed the court that Ake had the necessary competency to stand
trial. Ake's counsel requested funds for a psychiatric examination to deter-
mine Ake's sanity at the time of the offense or, alternatively, examination by
a neutral, court-appointed psychiatrist.6 The trial court reasoned, on the
basis of the Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,7
that the state had no constitutional duty to provide such examinations and
denied both requests.
At trial8 Ake defended solely on the basis of insanity.9 Neither side, how-
l. The police apprehended the companion, Hatch, with Ake. On December 11, 1979, at
his attorney's request, the trial court ordered Hatch placed in a state institution for evaluation
of his mental competency for trial. At a preliminary hearing the court found Hatch competent
to stand trial.
2. The Court did not discuss whether the sheriff gave Ake a Miranda warning (Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) or whether Ake had an attorney's counsel at the time that he
dictated the statement regarding the offense.
3. Ake appeared in court: (1) for arraignment on November 23, 1979; (2) on December
11, 1979, when the attorney for Ake's companion in the crime, who was arrested at the same
time as Ake, requested a competency examination for his client; and (3) on January 21, 1980,
for a preliminary hearing.
4. The above-mentioned facts of the case appear only in Justice Rehnquist's dissent, Ake
v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1099-1100, 53 L. Ed. 2d 53, 69-70 (1985); the majority opinion
makes no reference to them.
5. The trial court had not ordered an examination of Ake's sanity at the time of the
offense.
6. Ake's counsel made the request for psychiatric assistance at the pretrial hearing held
after the state institution informed the court of Ake's competency.
7. 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953).
8. Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of shooting
with intent to kill.
9. The relevant Oklahoma statute states:
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ever, produced expert testimony regarding Ake's sanity at the time of the
offense; neither side had ever examined him on that question. 10 The jury
found Ake guilty on all counts. During sentencing the state relied on its
psychiatrists' testimony to establish the likelihood of Ake's future dangerous
behavior."1 Without an expert witness the defense could neither rebut nor
introduce mitigating evidence. The jury imposed the death penalty on both
murder counts.' 2 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, re-
jecting Ake's plea for a court-appointed psychiatrist. 13 Held, reversed and
remanded for a new trial: The Constitution mandates that states provide
appropriate psychiatric examination and assistance in the evaluation, prepa-
ration, and presentation of an insanity defense to a defendant who cannot
afford a psychiatrist and who has shown a likelihood that his sanity at the
time of the offense will prove significant during trial. At the sentencing
phase the state must also provide, on relevant questions, psychiatric exami-
nation, preparation assistance, and expert testimony. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105
S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985).
I. EXPERT PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND ASSISTANCE: STATUTES
AND THE COURTS
A. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi 4 the Court held broadly that states
did not have a constitutional duty to appoint a psychiatrist to make a pre-
trial examination. 15 In Smith, however, a psychiatrist appointed by the trial
court had examined the defendant. This neutral psychiatrist and two other
[a]ll persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the
following classes . . . (4) Lunatics, insane persons and all persons of unsound
mind, including persons temporarily or partially deprived of reason, upon proof
that at the time of committing the act charged against them they were incapable
of knowing its wrongfulness.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152 (West 1983). A presumption of sanity exists in each case
until the defendant produces evidence raising reasonable doubt regarding his sanity at the time
of the offense. If the defendant meets this burden, the state then has the burden of proving the
defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 53, 59 (1985).
10. The defense called as its only witnesses three psychiatrists who examined Ake after his
apprehension. Each testified,to the defendant's mental illness at the time they examined him.
Brief for Petitioner at 6. In addition, in response to the state's questions, each psychiatrist
testified that he had not examined Ake on his sanity at the time of the offense. Id. at 6-9.
11. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1983) provides that the jury may impose
the death sentence if it finds at least one of the specified aggravating circumstances, which
include "It]he existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Id. § 701.12(7).
12. In addition, Ake was sentenced to 500 years imprisonment on each of the two counts
of shooting with intent to kill.
13. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
14. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
15. Id. at 568. The Smith majority cited McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 155 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951), to support its broad holding. 344 U.S. at 568. Impar-
tial psychiatrists, however, also examined the defendant in McGarty. In addition, the McGarty
court indicated that the Constitution might require examination by an independent psychia-
trist if the defendant questioned the competence, impartiality, or thoroughness of the court-
appointed expert. 188 F.2d at 157.
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psychiatrists called by the defense had testified as to the defendant's sanity
during the commission of the crime and at trial. The Court found that the
trial had sufficiently protected the defendant's rights because the trial court
had heard the issue of the defendant's sanity and because psychiatrists had
testified. ' 6
Several courts have relied on Smith as authority for rejecting all requests
for psychiatric assistance at state expense. 17 The facts in Smith, however,
could require a more limited interpretation. For example, in Bush v. McCol-
um 18 a federal district court reasoned that the Smith Court's holding had
depended on the fact that three testifying psychiatrists had examined the
defendant.1 9 Relying on Smith, the district court held that the state had
denied the petitioner, Bush, due process of law when it refused his attorney's
request for psychiatric assistance.20 The Smith Court's refusal to require a
state to provide psychiatric services for indigent defendants was consistent
with the limited rights then recognized for criminal defendants in state
courts.21 The Supreme Court's subsequent decisions concerning the rights
of criminal defendants severely undercut the Smith decision to the extent
that the Smith decision denied the existence of a constitutional right to a
psychiatric expert. 2 2
16. 344 U.S. at 568. The Smith defendant, like Ake, faced a potential death sentence. Id.
at 562. The majority and the dissent noted with approval the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
statement of the common law principle that a state cannot execute an insane person. Id. at
569, 571 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 116-19, 71 A.2d 107, 118-
20 (1950)).
17. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 229 Ga. 536, 192 S.E.2d 249, 251-52 (1972) (relying on
Smith, court found psychiatric examination not constitutionally required but within discretion
of trial judge); Trowbridge v. State, 502 P.2d 495, 502 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (court denied
request for defense services as matter of constitutional right, following Smith); Commonwealth
v. Gelormo, 327 Pa. Super. 219, 475 A.2d 765, 769 (1984) (same); Haughtaling v. Common-
wealth, 209 Va. 309, 163 S.E.2d 560, 562, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1021 (1968) (same); see also
Nelson v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 797, 151 N.W.2d 694, 703 (1967) (equal protection and due process
clauses do not require appointment of experts, citing Smith); cf State v. Gonzales, 111 Ariz.
38, 523 P.2d 66, 68 (1974) (no constitutional right to appointment of psychiatric expert); Crain
v. State, 394 S.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (summary dismissal of request for
payment of experts because appointment not authorized by any constitutional or statutory
provision).
18. 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), affid, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
19. 231 F. Supp. at 564.
20. Id. The district court believed that the Smith majority would have agreed with the
dissenting Justices' statement that refusing expert assistance necessary to sustain an insanity
defense denied due process. Id. (quoting Smith, 344 U.S. at 571 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting,
joined by Black and Douglas, JJ.)).
21. See Comment, An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to a Psychiatric
Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 488-89.
22. Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1390 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979); see, e.g., Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (states required to provide counsel for indigent criminal de-
fendant's first direct appeal of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (state must
provide counsel for defendant who cannot afford to pay for his own attorney); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959) (state's requirement that defendant pay fee before filing notice of appeal
struck down); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state must provide without cost trial
transcript necessary to exercise right to appeal provided by state). See generally Goldstein &
Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
1061, 1086-89 (1962) (state should assure equality in trial conditions).
1985)
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B. The Supreme Court's Promotion of the Rights of Indigent Defendants
Constitutional protection of the rights of criminal defendants in state
courts emanates from the fourteenth amendment's equal protection 23 and
due process clauses.24 In interpreting the due process clause and establish-
ing the extent of its protection, the Supreme Court has incorporated certain
fundamental provisions of the Bill of Rights. 25 In addition, under the due
process and equal protection clauses, the Court has implicitly recognized a
fundamental right to fairness in criminal proceedings26 and provided addi-
tional guarantees that the Bill of Rights did not include.
2 7
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights. In the 1930s the Court began to apply
provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states by incorporating them into the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause.28 The Court rejected a total
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. 29 Instead, the Court selectively incorpo-
rated only those provisions found to protect fundamental rights "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" 30 by requiring incorporation of rights "fun-
damental to the American scheme of justice." 31
The sixth amendment provides to criminal defendants the right to the
assistance of counsel. 32 In Betts v. Brady,33 however, the Court held the
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
24. See id. stating that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... "
25. Id. amends. I-X. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 452-57 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK] (discussion of Supreme
Court decisions incorporating various provisions of the Bill of Rights).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 47-57. See generally NOWAK, supra note 25, at
457-61 (discussion of various fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme Court, including
implicitly recognized right to fairness in criminal proceedings).
27. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937) (state cannot impinge on
first amendment right to freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
707 (1931) (fourteenth amendment due process clause encompasses first amendment right to
freedom of the press); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (due process includes
first amendment right to freedom of speech).
29. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (fourteenth amendment did not incor-
porate some facets of the fifth amendment's double jeopardy ban). Justices Black and Douglas
favored total incorporation, but not recognition of additional fundamental rights. See Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.). Other
Justices favored total incorporation and recognition of additional fundamental rights. Id. at
124 (Murphy, J., dissenting, joined by Rutledge, J.). See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 28-29 (5th ed. 1980) (discussion of decisions
supporting selective incorporation and the Adamson dissenting opinions).
30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
31. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Originally the Court
interpreted the right as a mere guarantee of the right to retain counsel. Andersen v. Treat, 172
U.S. 24, 29 (1898). In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), however, the Court held that
the sixth amendment requires the federal courts to provide counsel for indigent defendants
threatened with impairment of life or liberty. Id. at 463.
33. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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right to assistance of counsel to be not fundamental. 34 The Court required
only that a state provide appointed counsel when lack of counsel in a partic-
ular case would result in fundamental unfairness. 35 The Betts decision con-
flicted with prior Supreme Court statements on the nature of the right to
counsel. 36 Under Betts, however, the Court had not yet held that a funda-
mental right to the assistance of counsel in state court existed. In Gideon v.
Wainwright37 the Court, overriding Betts, reaffirmed the fundamental nature
of the right to counsel. 38 The Court incorporated the sixth amendment right
to counsel into the fourteenth amendment and held that a state must provide
counsel for a defendant in felony cases39 who cannot afford to pay for his
own attorney. 4° Courts today interpret the right to assistance of counsel as
the right to effective assistance of counsel.41
The Court recently mandated measurement of the effectiveness of counsel
by the reasonably-effective-assistance standard. 42 When counsel's conduct
undercuts the system so as to raise a question about the fairness of the de-
fendant's trial, then a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel may properly
arise.4 3 The sixth amendment also guarantees to every criminal defendant
34. Id. at 471.
35. Id. at 471-72. The Court based its decision on an historical review of the applicable
state common law and legislative and constitutional provisions. Id. at 465-71.
36. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932), the Court held that the right to ap-
pointed counsel was fundamental. The Court, however, limited its holding to the facts and
circumstances of the case and required appointment of counsel only in capital cases for indi-
gent defendants unable to defend themselves. Id. at 71; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462 (1938) (counsel necessary to assure fundamental rights); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936) (right to counsel constitutes fundamental right).
37. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
38. Id. at 344.
39. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the Court extended the right to
counsel to certain misdemeanor cases. Later, however, the Supreme Court confined
Argersinger v. Hamlin to its facts. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
40. 372 U.S. at 344-45; accord Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (incorporat-
ing right to counsel at preliminary hearing). The Court subsequently adopted a new test re-
quiring incorporation of rights "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial incorporated into
fourteenth amendment). This test replaced "a fair and enlightened system of justice" test.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Under the new test the Court may incorpo-
rate provisions with special value to individual liberty in our society even if democratic theory
does not require recognition of such provisions. NOWAK, supra note 25, at 455. The four-
teenth amendment incorporates nearly all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Id. The
fourteenth amendment does not, however, incorporate the grand jury clause of the fifth
amendment or the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases. In addition, the
Court has not considered the incorporation of the third amendment's prohibition of the quar-
tering of soldiers in private homes, the eighth amendment's excessive fines provision, or the
ninth amendment. Id. at 455-56.
41. See United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 664 (1984);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
42. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-93 (1984).
The Court mandated consideration of all of the circumstances, but did not state specific re-
quirements. A presumption exists that counsel performed reasonably and effectively. See
generally Note, Constitutional Law-The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Quandry: The De-
bate Continues-Strickland v. Washington, 18 AKRON L. REV. 325 (1984).
43. See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 692-93.
1985]
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the right to compulsory process to obtain defense witnesses. 44 After Smith,
in Washington v. Texas,45 the Court incorporated the compulsory process
guarantee into the fourteenth amendment.46
Additional Guarantees Not Included in the Bill of Rights. The Supreme
Court has also promoted the rights of indigent defendants by implicitly rec-
ognizing a fundamental right to fairness in criminal proceedings. This im-
plicitly recognized right emanates from the equal protection and due process
clauses. 4 7 In Griffin v. Illinois48 the Court required states to provide free
trial transcripts necessary to exercise the right to appeal offered by the
state.4 9 Similarly, in Burns v. Ohio50 the Court struck down a state's re-
quirement that a defendant pay a fee before filing notice of appeal.5 1 In
Douglas v. California 52 the Court also required that the states provide assist-
ance of counsel for the first direct appeal of right.
53
In summary, the Court generally requires the states to provide the essen-
tial elements necessary to present an adequate defense or appeal for indigent
defendants even though the states usually charge defendants a fee for those
elements. 54 The Court, however, has not yet clearly identified all of the ele-
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ... 
45. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
46. Id. at 17-19.
47. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The equal protection clause provides the
authority for most decisions in indigence cases. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09
(1974).
48. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
49. Id. at 19. The Court stated that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Id.; accord Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S.
189, 196-98 (1971) (right to trial transcript for appeal of misdemeanor conviction); Roberts v.
Lavalle, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (right to transcript of preliminary hearing).
50. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
51. Id. at 257-58; accord Land v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1963) (equal protection
denied by state's refusal of appellate review of denial of writ of error coram nobis solely be-
cause of indigence); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (equal protection denied by
state's refusal to docket appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus because prisoner unable to
pay filing fee).
52. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
53. Id. at 357; accord Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (prisoners have right to
access to law library or professional assistance in habeas corpus proceedings). The Court did
not ever state the exact theoretical basis for the Griffin and Douglas decisions. Some of the
Court's support derived from the equal protection clause and the due process clause. Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974). To the extent that the Griffin and Douglas cases relied
upon the equal protection clause, the Court did not clearly state the requirements of equal
protection. In his concurring opinion to the Griffin decision, Justice Frankfurter argued that
equal protection did not require that the state provide absolute economic equality. 351 U.S. at
23. Justice Douglas, writing for the Douglas majority, stated that the Constitution does not
require absolute equality among criminal defendants. 372 U.S. at 357. In Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. at 616, the Court, adopting Justice Frankfurter's rationale, found no equal protection
right to counsel for a discretionary appeal. The Court subsequently stated that the premise
that indigents must have a meaningful opportunity to litigate their claims provided a common
rationale for these cases. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977).
54. But see Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971) (under circumstances of this
case due process does not require that state provide transcript of first murder trial for defense
in second murder trial).
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ments included in the guarantee. 55 In recent decisions the Court has estab-
lished and applied a three-factor balancing test for use in determining the
requirements of due process.56 The factors include:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.57
C. The Role of Psychiatrists in the Courts
Psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health experts may cur-
rently testify regarding a number of issues, including competency for trial,
the diminished responsibility doctrine, 58 and the insanity defense.59 These
experts may also testify in sentencing and parole hearings. 60 In modem trial
practice, however, psychiatric experts can do far more than testify in court.
They can assist counsel in preparing and designing the defendant's case, in
assembling, creating, and interpreting information regarding the defendant's
mental condition, and in cross-examining the opponent's psychiatrist or the
court-appointed psychiatrist. 61 Controversy surrounds the current extensive
participation of mental health experts in the criminal process. 6
2
55. See id.; State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (1982) (determination of due
process requirements depends on facts of individual case).
56. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (appointment of
counsel not required in court action terminating parental rights); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1,
6 (1981) (indigent putative father had due process right to state payment for blood grouping
test in quasi-criminal paternity action); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Divs. v. Craft, 436 U.S.
1, 17-18 (1978) (notice and hearing opportunity required before termination of utility service);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (no due process requirement of administrative
hearing before discontinuance of disability benefits). See generally NOWAK, supra note 25, at
560-62 (difficult to predict how court will rule when using balancing test); Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 30 (1976) (balancing test
emphasizes technique instead of value).
57. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
58. The diminished responsibility doctrine holds that some defendants, due to mental ill-
ness or defects, may not achieve the mens rea required for commission of the crime charged.
BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 412 (5th ed. 1979). Although not an affirmative defense, attor-
neys frequently introduce evidence of diminished responsibility to reduce the punishment or
the degree of the offense charged. Id. Diminished responsibility is also referred to as partial
insanity. Id.; see Comment supra note 21, at 485 n.30.
59. For an example of one state's codification of the insanity defense, see supra note 9.
60. See Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Uncon-
scious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 974 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Morse, Failed Explanations]. Ex-
pert testimony, appropriately used, provides a necessary inference not within the common
knowledge of jurors. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 601 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Morse, Crazy Behavior].
61. Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert-Some Comments Concerning
Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REv.
99, 116 (1976); Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 6-7, 10-12,
Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985).
62. Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process:
The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 428-29 (1980). One judge stated that
psychiatric testimony is unusually unreliable and unproductive. Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the
1985]
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In most jurisdictions the defendant may rely solely on the testimony of lay
witnesses to support his insanity defense despite the availability of expert
testimony. 63 Lay witnesses, however, would probably consider only the
most severe symptoms as indications of mental illnesses.64 Furthermore, lay
testimony would be unlikely to convince the jury, particularly if the prosecu-
tion's expert were to disagree.
65
As a practical matter, given the current degree of reliance on psychiatric
experts, 66 a defendant has little chance of succeeding with an insanity de-
fense without expert assistance. 67 Thus, unfair prejudice to the defendant
may result if he cannot rebut the testimony of the prosecution's experts. 68
Indigent defendants' inability to obtain payment for expert witnesses and
investigators has resulted in erroneous convictions. 69 Over twenty years ago
Adversary Process, SCi. AM., June 1974, at 18. Some commentators contend that psychiatric
testimony does not constitute admissible evidence. D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 63
(1980) (psychological testimony, given present development of psychology as a social science,
does not meet scientific standards for evidence); J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY ch. 1 (2d ed. 1975) (psychiatric testimony is too speculative,
uncertain, and subjective for admission into evidence). Disagreement exists about the proper
degree of reliance on psychiatric experts. Morse, Failed Explanations, supra note 60, at 973-74
(citing Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 60, at 543-54 and Bonnie & Slobogin, supra, at 492-
95). Morse argues that the present reliance on psychiatric experts is "unwise, unjustified, and
unnecessary, because such reliance often confuses social questions with scientific issues." Bon-
nie & Slobogin recommend increased use of mental health experts in criminal cases. Other
commentators favor limitation of psychiatric testimony to impartial assistants of the court.
See Molinari, The Role of the Expert Witness, 9 FORUM 789, 794 (1974) (suggests considera-
tion of experts as nonpartisan assistants of the court); Smith, The Ideal Use of Expert Testi-
mony in Psychology, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 300, 302 (1967) (advocates impartial experts). Contra
Gardner, supra note 61, at 114-15 (use of impartial expert eliminates adversary proceeding);
Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 60, at 625 (mental health experts cannot be impartial).
63. See, e.g., Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534, 547 (9th Cir. 1966) (sheriff and deputies
properly allowed to testify regarding defendant's sanity because they had previously had con-
tact with insane persons and persons claiming to be insane); State v. Conn, 286 Md. 406, 408
A.2d 700, 700 (1979) (layman may testify regarding sanity because normal or abnormal behav-
ior is matter of common knowledge); Commonwealth v. Young, 276 Pa. Super. 409, 419 A.2d
523, 526 (1980) (laymen may testify regarding sanity if they state basis for their opinion). See
also F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATr, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASES
§ 576 (1970) (general procedure, followed in all states except Massachusetts, Maine, and New
York, allows lay testimony on questions of sanity).
64. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 124 (1967). The symptoms of insanity have
proved difficult to discern and can be misleading. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950).
65. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 64, at 124; see F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLAT'r, supra note
63, § 175 (jury will be more impressed and affected by expert testimony).
66. See supra notes 60-61.
67. See Gardner, supra note 61, at 113 (expert testimony nearly essential for possibility of
success with insanity defense); Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and
the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1962) (without psychiatric expert de-
fendant cannot expect successful insanity defense); Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 60, at
625 (defense expert required to prove insanity); see also A. GOLDSTEIN, INSANITY DEFENSE
124-25 (1967) (if defendant could succeed without expert, he could only do so in a case so clear
that the prosecutor would not bring it).
68. Reilly v. Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929); see Note, The Indigent's
Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings,
55 CORNELL L. REV. 632, 632 (1970) (indigents' counsels' inability to match states' expert
resources resulted in legal inequality).
69. Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN.
L. REV. 1054, 1060 (1963).
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Justice Brennan noted that if an indigent defendant's attorney cannot obtain
necessary psychiatric assistance then he may often encounter difficulties in
promoting his client's insanity defense. 70
D. Current Statutes and Court Decisions
In federal court indigent defendants accused of a crime may obtain funds
for expert witnesses, including psychiatrists, under the Criminal Justice Act
of 196471 if the judge finds the requested services to be necessary to an ade-
quate defense.72 The definition of necessity remains unresolved. Courts
have developed at least three different tests to determine necessity in cases
involving psychiatrists or psychologists. 73
Nineteen states have adopted statutes that provide varying degrees of ex-
pert psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants. Five of these states have
adopted statutes modeled on the federal statute,74 and twelve others have
adopted statutes that provide essentially the same expert psychiatric assist-
ance.75 Two states have adopted statutes providing greater assistance, such
70. Brennan, Law and Psychiatry Must Join in Defending Mentally Ill Criminals, 49
A.B.A. J. 239, 242 (1963); see J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY 75, 84-85 (1957) (no
attorney can prove his client's innocence without an expert in cases that necessitate such
testimony).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982) provides that:
Upon Request. Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investi-
gative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense may request
them in an ex parte application. Upon finding.., that the services are necessary
and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court ... shall
authorize counsel to obtain the services.
The chief judge must approve payments greater than $300.00 in advance. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e)(3) (1982). The Allen Commission, which produced the draft of the Act, stated
that the necessary services could include those of psychiatrists. Criminal Justice Act of 1963
(Public Defender): Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 205-06 (1963) (Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Criminal Justice).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(l) (1982).
73. See United States v. Jonas, 540 F.2d 566, 569 n.3 (7th Cir. 1976) (test is whether in
similar circumstances a reasonable unappointed attorney would obtain the services); United
States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (elements to consider include the likeli-
hood that defense is warranted and sufficiency of psychiatric assistance received from other
sources); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964), afj'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir. 1965) (test is whether sanity is seriously in issue); see also Decker, Expert Services in the
Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L.
REV. 574, 604-11 (1982).
74. IOWA R. CRIM. P. 19 (Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4508 (1981); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6 (1974); N.Y. COUNTY
LAW § 722-c (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100 (Supp. 1984) (indigent entitled to representation by attor-
ney and necessary services including investigation and other preparation); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1978) (state-compensated expert witnesses available in capital cases if rea-
sonably necessary); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West Supp. 1985) (in capital cases funds for
experts reasonably necessary for preparation or presentation of defense available if approved in
advance by court); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-403 (Supp. 1984) (indigent entitled to legal repre-
sentation and supporting services); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216(a) (Supp. 1985) (expert appointed
to assist defense counsel if counsel has reason to believe indigent defendant incompetent or
insane at time of offense); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 802-7 (Supp. 1984) (court may authorize
payments or waiver of expenses for services necessary for adequate defense); KY. REV. STAT.
§§ 31.070,.110, .185 (1980) (indigent entitled to representation by attorney and necessary serv-
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as entitlement to an examination by an expert of the defendant's own choos-
ing. 76 Five additional states provide less assistance or limit the availability
of assistance. 77 In addition, numerous states have statutes that provide for
reimbursement of necessary expenses of appointed counsel for indigent de-
fendants. 78 Reimbursement, however, often comes within the discretion of
the trial court even when the legislature has authorized psychiatric assist-
ance. 79 One state provides expert psychiatric assistance through an estab-
lished public defender program, which includes authorization for hiring
ices including investigation and other preparation); NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.135 (1983) (ap-
pointed counsel reimbursed for necessary expert services if court approves ex parte
application); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (1981) (payment for testimony of expert witness
within discretion of court); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.055(4) (1984) (payment available for costs
of expert assistance necessary for defense preparation and presentation if prior trial court ap-
proval is received); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-207(b) (Supp. 1984) (in capital cases court may
authorize constitutionally required expert services in ex parte hearing); W. VA. CODE § 29-21-
14(e)(3) (Supp. 1984) (appointed counsel entitled to reimbursement for expenses, including
expert witness fees). See State v. Peeler, 126 Ariz. 254, 614 P.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1980) (consti-
tution may mandate appointment of expert in noncapital cases if refusal would severely preju-
dice defendant); People v. Worth, 109 Cal. App. 3d 514, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (1980) (trial
court may appoint expert if defendant shows necessity based on due process, equal protection,
and right to effective counsel); State v. Gray, 292 N.C. 270, 233 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1977) (assist-
ance provided under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (1981), if necessary to fair trial or if expert's
services will materially assist defense preparation).
76. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1985) (indigent defendant enti-
tled to independent psychiatric evaluation, at state expense, by expert of defendant's choosing);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.77.020(2), .060(1) (1980) (court appoints panel of experts if
competency at issue or if defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity; defendant also
entitled to examination by and assistance of expert appointed on his behalf).
77. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 17-456 (Supp. 1983) (authorizes counties to create funds for legal
expense and payment of expert witness fees for defense of indigents); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 261, § 27C(4) (West Supp. 1985) (state payment available if trial court finds services rea-
sonably necessary to insure indigent equally effective defense or appeal); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
17-19 (Supp. 1984) (trial court, in its discretion, may authorize state payment for expert wit-
ness); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-1(3) (Supp. 1983) (state courts must provide necessary "in-
vestigatory and other facilities"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5205(c), 5231(2) (1974 & Supp.
1985) (counsel entitled to reimbursement of expenses, and indigent entitled to "necessary serv-
ices and facilities of representation").
78. ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (Supp. 1984) (counsel entitled to reimbursement for ex-
penses); GA. CODE ANN. § 27.3204(a) (Harrison 1983) (reimbursement for necessary expenses
of counsel, including investigation); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1984) (judge shall
allow reimbursement of actual expense of appointed counsel); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-201
(1983) (reasonable costs of attorney reimbursed); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1 (Supp. 1983)
(attorney reimbursed for expenses necessary to defense); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.51
(Page Supp. 1984) (appointed counsel reimbursed for expenses approved by trial court); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-3-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (fund established for payment of trial-court-ap-
proved expenses of appointed counsel); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-40-8 (Supp. 1984)
(assigned attorneys reimbursed for necessary expenses); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(a)
(Supp. 1984) (appointed attorneys entitled to compensation for necessary expenses); VA. CODE
§ 19.2-163 (Supp. 1985) (court may direct payment of appropriate expenses); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 7-1-108, -110, -116 (1977) (needy person entitled to counsel and "necessary services and
facilities of representation").
79. See, e.g., State v. Peeler, 126 Ariz. 254, 614 P.2d 335, 338 (Ct. App. 1980) (in noncapi-
tal cases appointment of experts falls within discretion of trial court, but may be constitution-
ally mandated if defendant would be severely prejudiced by denial); Collins v. State, 14 Md.
App. 674, 288 A.2d 221, 224 (trial court, within its discretion, may appoint expert if necessary
for fair presentation of defense), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 882 (1972); State v. Parton, 303 N.C.
55, 277 S.E.2d 410, 419 (1981) (appointment of investigator within discretion of trial court).
[Vol. 39
NOTES
necessary assistants and other employees. 80 State courts have used various
bases to find indigent defendants entitled to expert assistance that is reason-
ably necessary to their defense. These bases include the sixth amendment's
guarantees of effective assistance of counsel or compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses, 8' the fourteenth amendment's equal protection or due pro-
cess clauses, 82 or the facts of the specific case without any stated
constitutional or statutory basis for the decision.83
Although the extent of assistance and the rationale for providing it vary
substantiall) from state to state, a national consensus has emerged that some
degree of psychiatric assistance should be required. 84 In prior decisions the
Court has found such a consensus an important factor in determining the
nature of a right.8 5 The Court granted certiorari in Bush v. Texas8 6 to con-
sider the constitutional obligation of states to provide expert psychiatric
assistance. At the defendant's first trial the court determined his sanity
based on testimony of lay witnesses and a doctor without special training in
psychiatry. After the state provided a psychiatric evaluation, however, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for a new trial.8 7 The
80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4603 (1983) (public defender may appoint other employees
as he considers necessary).
81. See People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1966) (state cannot deprive
indigent defendant of substance of sixth amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses and must therefore pay reasonable fee to hire necessary expert); State v. Anaya, 456
A.2d 1255, 1261-62 (Me. 1983) (indigent defendant entitled to expert services necessary to
adequate defense under sixth amendment's guarantees of an effective assistance of counsel and
fair trial, the equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment, and similar provisions of state
constitution); State v. Cunningham, 18 Wash. App. 517, 569 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1977) (defend-
ant's constitutional right to counsel may include expert psychiatric assistance).
82. See People v. Worth, 109 Cal. App. 3d 514, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (1980) (trial court
may appoint expert if defendant shows necessity; decision based on due process, equal protec-
tion, and right to effective assistance of counsel); State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485, 490 (La.
1977) (equal protection requires state to pay for investigator if attorney for indigent defendant
cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to defense); State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1261-62
(Me. 1983) (indigent defendant entitled to expert services necessary to adequate defense under
sixth amendment, equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment, and state constitution).
But see State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982) (defendant who had received
psychiatric examination at state expense in compliance with Idaho Code § 18-211 (Supp. 1985)
held not entitled under equal protection or due process clauses to state funds for additional
examination).
83. See State v. Clemons, 168 Conn. 395, 363 A.2d 33, 38 (state should provide indigent
defendant access to independent expert if state has access to and plans to use expert testimony
and defendant has shown reasonable necessity), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975); Owen v.
State, 272 Ind. 122, 396 N.E.2d 376, 380 (1979) (fourteenth amendment's due process clause
does not entitle indigent defendants to expert assistance at public expense, but trial court has
authority to appoint necessary experts); State v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, 264 N.W.2d 876, 879
(1978) (state appointment of and payment for expert for indigent defendant within discretion
of trial court); Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa. Super. 219, 475 A.2d 765, 769 (1984)
(same).
84. Brief for Petitioner at 23-26, Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53
(1985).
85. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-97 (1982) (heavy weight given to
consensus of state legislatures regarding meaning of eighth amendment); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (nationwide consensus "reflects, if it does not establish ... the funda-
mental nature of that right").
86. 372 U.S. 586 (1963).
87. Id. at 588. On remand, sub nom. Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex.
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Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of expert assistance for
twenty-two years.
II. AKE V. OKLAHOMA
In Ake v. Oklahoma the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of the
states' obligation to provide psychiatric examination and assistance in evalu-
ation, preparation, and presentation of an insanity defense and evidence on
relevant issues at the sentencing phase. The Court held that states must
provide appropriate psychiatric examination and assistance for a defendant
who has shown a likelihood that his sanity at the time of the offense will
prove significant during trial. 88 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, 89
found that a state must implement procedures to ensure that an indigent
criminal defendant has a fair opportunity to defend himself in court.90 The
Court cited many of its prior decisions dealing with the constitutional rights
of indigent defendants9 and concluded that "meaningful access to justice"
constituted the unifying rationale of the decisions. 92 Such meaningful access
requires that a state provide the essential elements necessary to present an
adequate defense or appeal for a defendant who cannot afford them.93
The Court rejected the state's assertion, based on the Court's decision in
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,9 4 that a defendant has no constitutional
right to a psychiatric examination to determine his sanity at the time of the
offense. 95 The majority stated that, at most, the Smith decision provides that
1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965), the court found a denial of due process
due to ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Bush, 172 Tex. Crim. 54, 353 S.W.2d 855
(1962) (original state appellate court decision). The Supreme Court expressed concern about
psychiatric assistance for indigents during oral argument of Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983). Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals at 11,
Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985).
88. 105 S. Ct. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66-67. The Court's jurisdiction also became an
issue in the case. The Court found it had jurisdiction to hear the case because the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling that Ake had waived his request for a psychiatrist had no
basis in state law. Id. at 1092, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 60. The state contended that Ake waived the
request for psychiatric assistance by not including the request in his new trial motion. Id.
(citing Hawkins v. State, 569 P.2d 490, 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)). Violations of constitu-
tional rights, however, constitute fundamental error, 105 S. Ct. at 1092-93, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 61
(citing Buchanan v. State, 523 P.2d 1134, 1137 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974)), and therefore, do
not become subject to waiver. 105 S. Ct. at 1092, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 61 (citing Hawkins v. State,
569 P.2d 490, 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)). Since the state procedural question, waiver,
depended on the federal constitutional issue, psychiatric examination, the Court found no in-
dependent state ground for the decision. 105 S. Ct. at 1093, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 61 (citing Enter-
prise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917)).
89. Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined the major-
ity opinion. 84 L. Ed. 2d at 53 (this information was not published in the Supreme Court
Reporter). Chief Justice Burger concurred. 105 S. Ct. at 1099, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 68-69. Justice
Rehnquist dissented. 105 S. Ct. at 1099-1102, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 69-72.
90. 105 S. Ct. at 1093, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 61.
91. See supra notes 23-57 and accompanying text.
92. 105 S. Ct. at 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 62.
93. Id. (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971); see supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text).
94. 344 U.S. 561 (1953); see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
95. 105 S. Ct. at 1098, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 67.
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a defendant has no right to more assistance than the Smith defendant re-
ceived. 96 In addition, the Court concluded that the issues raised by Ake
differed from the questions considered in Smith due to the Court's recogni-
tion of greater rights for indigent criminal defendants subsequent to Smith9 7
and changes in trial practice and the legislative treatment of insanity.9 8
Therefore, the Court did not consider itself limited by Smith in determining
the requirements of fundamental fairness. 99
In Mathews v. Eldridge1 °c the Court promulgated a three-factor balancing
test to determine due process requirements in the administrative law context.
The Ake Court reaffirmed ° 1 application of the Mathews test to areas other
than administrative law. 10 2 The three factors were: (1) the defendant's indi-
vidual interests affected by the state's current procedure; (2) the state's inter-
ests affected if the court mandates the proposed procedure; and (3) the likely
benefits from adoption of the proposed procedure and the risk of mistaken
deprivation of the defendant's individual interests in the absence of the pro-
posed procedure. 10 3
In analyzing the first factor the Court found that in criminal proceedings
involving potential jail sentences or the death penalty the defendant's indi-
vidual interest clearly and strongly influenced the balancing test.' ° 4 Under
the second factor the Court found the state's interest in economy to be the
only governmental interest weighing against the extension of the proposed
safeguard.10 5 Oklahoma asserted that providing psychiatric assistance to
Ake and other similarly situated defendants would cause an overwhelming
increase in expenses.' 0 6 The Court found this argument to be unconvincing
96. Id. A neutral psychiatrist and two other psychiatrists examined the Smith defendant
and testified at trial. 344 U.S. at 568; see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 37-46 & 48-55.
98. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
99. 105 S. Ct. at 1098, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 67. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 624-25 (1979)
(Stewart, J., concurring), the Court stated that decisions regarding mental illness often involve
policy questions in the guise of constitutional issues.
100. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
101. The Court previously applied the Mathews test in two nonadministrative cases. See
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (appointment of counsel not
required in court action terminating parental rights); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981)
(indigent putative father had due process right to state payment for blood grouping test in
quasi-criminal paternity action).
102. 105 S. Ct. at 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 62; see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text
(discussing the three-factor test and its prior application). The Court did not discuss the appli-
cation of the equal protection clause or the sixth amendment because, due to its holding on the
requirements of the due process clause, the Court believed such discussion unnecessary. 105 S.
Ct. at 1099 n.13, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 68 n.13.
103. 105 S. Ct. at 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 62; see supra text accompanying notes 37-46 & 48-
55.
104. 105 S. Ct. at 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63. The Court noted the importance of this interest
in prior establishment of other procedural safeguards. See supra notes 37-40, 47-59 and ac-
companying text.
105. 105 S. Ct. at 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63. The Court did not discuss Oklahoma's asser-
tion that establishment of the right to psychiatric assistance would result in delays in execution
of death sentences. Brief for Respondent at 46.
106. Brief for Respondent at 46-47. The state asserted that every defendant with a past or
present mental problem would claim the right to assistance to determine if a reasonable doubt
existed as to his sanity at the time of the crime. Id. at 47. The Court, however, noted that
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because the federal government and many states presently make such assist-
ance available without prohibitive expense. 107 Further, the Court found a
second state interest, the interest in prevailing in litigation, to be mitigated
by the state's compelling interest in fair and accurate adjudication.10  Con-
sidering the state and individual interest in accurate adjudication, the Court
found the state interest in denying psychiatric assistance to be
insubstantial. 109
Finally, the Court considered the likely benefits from adoption of the pro-
posed procedure and the risk of mistaken deprivation of the defendant's indi-
vidual interests in the absence of the proposed procedure. The Court noted
that psychiatry has a pivotal function in criminal actions when a state has
made the defendant's mental condition a factor in determining his criminal
responsibility and punishment. 10 Justice Marshall noted that juries consti-
tute the main fact finders on questions of insanity. I"' Although the Court
specifically withheld judgment on the propriety of modern courts' extensive
reliance on psychiatrists, 112 the majority recognized the inequity of denying
indigent defendants psychiatric assistance in the context of that current
reliance. 113
The Court found that the likely benefits from psychiatric assistance are
greatest when the defendant's mental condition constitutes a serious issue.' 14
The Court thus concluded that a state must provide psychiatric assistance
when the defendant makes an ex parte showing that his sanity will likely be
important in his defense." 5 The majority did not specify what constitutes a
sufficient showing that the defendant's sanity will prove significant to his
defense.11 6 Instead, the Court identified six factors that indicated that Ake's
sanity would be an important issue in the case: (1) Ake presented no other
defenses; (2) Ake acted bizarrely at arraignment; (3) the state psychiatrists
originally found Ake incompetent for trial and recommended commitment;
even the state recognized that its interest in economy did not always outweigh the individual
interest. 105 S. Ct. at 1097 n.9, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66 n.9.
107. 105 S. Ct. at 1094, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63; see supra text accompanying notes 71-83.
108. 105 S. Ct. at 1095, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63.
109. Id., 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63-64.
110. Id., 84 L. Ed. 2d at 64. Federal and state statutes and decisions assuring indigent
defendants access to such assistance reflect the importance of psychiatric assistance. See supra
notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
111. 105 S. Ct. at 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 65; see Huckabee, Resolving the Problem of Domi-
nance of Psychiatrists in Criminal Responsibility Decisions: A Proposal, 27 Sw. L.J. 790, 790
(1973) (courts, although tending to entrust determination of defendants' criminal responsibil-
ity to psychiatrists, agree that criminal responsibility decisions remain judgments for juries).
112. 105 S. Ct. at 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 65. The Court noted that psychiatric testimony can
prove critical because of the complicated nature of the insanity issue. Id. In addition, psychia-
trists can assist the defense in investigation and interpretation. Id.; see supra notes 58-70 and
accompanying text. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 64, ch. 7 (objections possibly
proper to expert's answers to test questions).
113. 105 S. Ct. at 1096, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 68.
114. Id. at 1096-97, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 65-66; see supra note 73 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing alternate tests of necessity under the federal expert assistance statute).
115. 105 S. Ct. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66.
116. Id. at 1096-97, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 65-66. The Court, therefore, did not resolve the neces-
sity question that has troubled the federal courts. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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(4) the state psychiatrists conditioned Ake's competence for trial on seda-
tion; (5) psychiatrists testified regarding Ake's serious mental illness six
months after the murders and suggested that the illness might have begun
many years ago; and (6) Oklahoma recognized an insanity defense with an
initial burden of producing evidence on the defendant." 17
The Court left the states free to determine the method for implementing
the recognized right to psychiatric assistance. 1 8 The majority, however,
specified that if the defendant makes the required preliminary showing, the
state must at least afford the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist to
perform appropriate examinations and assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense. 19 The majority limited the defendant's right to
the assistance of one psychiatrist 120 and did not require a state to allow the
defendant to choose his own psychiatrist. 12 1
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of whether a state had an obligation
to provide psychiatric examination and assistance in evaluation, preparation,
and presentation of evidence to rebut a state's evidence of future dangerous-
ness in a capital sentencing proceeding. 122 The Court again considered the
three factors relevant to a due process determination 123 and found their rea-
soning to be applicable to this issue as well. 124 The defendant's interest in
fair and accurate adjudication of the capital sentencing proceeding remains
clear.12 5 The majority did not find the state interest in economy convincing
on this issue either.126 It recognized, however, a profound government inter-
est in fair and accurate imposition of capital punishment. 127
The Court found the third factor, the likely benefits from adoption of the
proposed procedure and the risk of mistaken deprivation of the defendant's
individual interests without the proposed procedure, to be critical in its deci-
sion on this issue. 128 In Barefoot v. Estelle129 a majority approved the use of
psychiatric testimony on the question of future dangerousness. 130 The Court
117. 105 S. Ct. at 1098, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 68.
118. Id. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the
Court also left implementation of the right to counsel to the states. Id. at 345.
119. 105 S. Ct. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66.
120. Id. at 1095, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63.
121. Id. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66.
122. Id. The Court did not require a finding that future dangerousness will constitute a
significant factor in the sentencing phase as a precondition to psychiatric assistance. In Ake's
case, however, the majority found future dangerousness a significant factor because: (1) the
state psychiatrist testified that Ake could be dangerous in the future due to his mental illness;
(2) Oklahoma law includes future dangerousness as an aggravating factor; and (3) the prosecu-
tor relied on the state psychiatrist's testimony at sentencing. Id. at 1099, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 68;
see supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma capital sentencing statute).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57, 102-03.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 104-13.
125. 105 S. Ct. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66.
126. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
127. 105 S. Ct. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66.
128. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 110-17.
129. 463 U.S. 800 (1983).
130. Id. at 896-905. The Court approved the use of such testimony in spite of professional
questions regarding its validity. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 454 n.8 (1981) (psychiatric
examination meaningless in prediction of future dangerousness if defendant unwilling to coop-
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partially based its Barefoot holding on an assumption that the factfinder
would have the opportunity to consider the views of the prosecution's and
the defendant's experts and could therefore recognize and allow for the limi-
tations of such predictions."' Considering the circumstances, the serious
effect of error, the clear relevance of rebutting psychiatric testimony, and the
minimal burden in providing assistance, the Court held that due process re-
quired access to psychiatric examination, assistance in preparation, and testi-
mony on relevant issues in the sentencing phase. 132
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, stated that the facts of the
Ake case confined the Court's holding to capital cases.1 33 Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, did not agree that the facts in the Ake case justified the majority's
holding 134 because the nature of the murders, the crimes that Ake commit-
ted in the month following the murders, Ake's forty-four-page statement,
and the failure of Ake's attorney to request a competency hearing when
Ake's companion requested one did not suggest insanity. 135 In addition,
Justice Rehnquist contended that the Constitution only requires an in-
dependent psychiatric evaluation in capital cases. 136
The dissent stated that the majority did not explain how Ake satisfied the
requirement of an ex parte showing that his sanity would likely prove a sig-
nificant factor in his defense. 137 Justice Rehnquist considered Ake's mental
illness six months after the offense to be an insufficient basis for a showing of
significance because the examining psychiatrists refused to infer an illness at
the time of the offense from the later mental illness.138 On the facts, Justice
Rehnquist agreed with the Oklahoma court's decision that Ake failed to
make the required showing. 139
Justice Rehnquist noted that the burden of proving insanity can fall on the
defendant.' 40 In addition, he concluded that due process does not require
that a state provide funds for an indigent defendant to pursue a state law
defense, such as insanity, as thoroughly as the defcndant might like."4 Fi-
erate). Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 60, at 600 (psychiatrists "far more likely to be
wrong than right" in predictions of future dangerousness).
131. 105 S. Ct. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66-67 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899
(1983)).
132. 105 S. Ct. at 1097, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 67.
133, Id. at 1099, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 68-69.
134. Id. at 1099, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 69.
135. Id. at 1101, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 71.
136. Id. Justice Rehnquist contended that the Constitution only requires one competent
opinion by a psychiatrist independent of the prosecutor's office. He noted that a psychiatrist
should give an opinion on a question of fact, not serve as an advocate. Id. at 1101-02, 84 L.
Ed. 2d at 72.
137. Id. at 1100, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 70. The majority listed six factors that it found to consti-
tute the required showing. See supra text accompanying note 117.
138. 105 S. Ct. at 1100, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 70. Justice Rehnquist would apparently require
introduction of evidence at trial to show insanity. Id.
139. Id. at 1100-01, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 70-71 (citing Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1983)).
140. Id.; see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977). Justice Rehnquist also
stated that due process may not require an insanity defense at all. 105 S. Ct. at 1101, 84 L. Ed.
2d at 71.
141. 105 S. Ct. at 1101, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 71.
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nally, Justice Rehnquist found that the Court did not need to reach the is-
sues raised by the sentencing proceedings1 42 and that the majority's
discussion on the sentencing issue constituted dictum. 143
III. CONCLUSION
In Ake v. Oklahoma the Supreme Court required a state to provide appro-
priate psychiatric examination and assistance in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of an insanity defense to an indigent defendant who has shown
a likelihood that his sanity at the time of the offense will prove a significant
issue at trial. A state must also provide similar services, on relevant issues,
at the sentencing phase. Justice Burger, in concurrence, stated that the facts
of Ake's case limit the Court's opinion to capital cases. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, concluded that the facts did not support the rule established.
Justice Rehnquist contended that the Constitution only required an in-
dependent psychiatric examination, not a defense consultant. Few states
currently provide an expert defense consultant as required by the majority
opinion. The states must, therefore, make significant changes to implement
the recognized right. Most states, however, will likely follow Justice Bur-
ger's suggestion to limit the holding to capital cases.
Helen Hubbard
142. Id. The dissent stated that the Court did not need to reach the sentencing issue be-
cause the majority mandated a new trial due to the lack of psychiatric testimony in the guilt
phase.
143. Id.
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